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RICHARD COPIER, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction for this case is conferred upon the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2) (d) (1953, as 
amended). 
Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
Appellant argued only one issue, whether the Salt Lake City 
ordinance for driving under the influence of alcohol is a public 
offense as its language slightly differs that the language used in 
the Utah State Code. This Court should give no deference to the 
ruling made in the trial court as it is a question of law and an 
interpretation of statute. 
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Appellee raises a second issue that there is additional 
language in City and State statutes that is identical. That 
language is an alternative to a person taking a chemical test and 
could have been the basis for the jury verdict to convict 
defendant. The standard of review is unclear as there is no 
transcript of the lower proceedings. However, appellee asserts 
that the record reflects sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's 
verdict. 
Determinative Provisions or Statutes 
The determinative statutes for this case are Section 12-24-100 
of the Salt Lake City Code and Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. 1953 
(as amended). Copies of the above statutes in effect at the time 
of the proceedings in this case are set out in the Addendum 
attached hereto. 
Statement of Case 
Defendant/Appellant Richard Copier (hereinafter referred to as 
defendant) was charged by way of Information with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor, which offense occurred 
on May 30, 1992, in Salt Lake City, Utah. The case was tried to a 
jury on August 24, 1992, with the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
presiding. The jury found defendant guilty (R. 43) and he was 
subsequently sentenced by the Court (R. 66, 67-68). 
Statement of Facts 
As no transcript has been filed in this case, the following 
facts are set out to provide this Court with some factual basis and 
understanding for defendant's conviction. 
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A Salt Lake City police officer stopped defendant after 
observing him run a red light. Defendant stated that he had had a 
few drinks at a party, which was confirmed by the officer's 
notation that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. 
Defendant took field sobriety tests but he was unable to perform 
them adequately. He took a breath test at the Salt Lake City 
Police Department, with a result of .101, as shown by the 
Intoxilyzer-Alcohol Analyzer test record card which was admitted 
into evidence (A copy of the Operational Checklist and test record 
card are attached in the Addendum hereto. They were admitted into 
evidence by the trial court but withdrawn at the end of trial. R. 
50, 51). The Intoxilyzer 5000 machine used by the Salt Lake City 
police was properly maintained and working correctly at the time 
defendant submitted to the breath test. 
Summary of Argument 
The Salt Lake City ordinance has only a semantic difference 
from the driving under the influence provision in the State Code. 
Appellant has provided no reasoning or basis to show that the 
variance is "materially different". The City ordinance should be 
liberally construed as the underlying policies of the City and 
State laws are the same. 
City and State driving under the influence laws both have 
alternative language to proving the results of a chemical test. A 
person can be found guilty if he is "incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle". As that issue was also submitted to the 
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jury, it could have been the basis for their decision, which should 
be upheld by this Court. 
Argument 
I. THE SALT LAKE CITY DUI ORDINANCE SETTING OUT A 
"0.08% OR GREATER BY WEIGHT" STANDARD 
CONSTITUTES A PUBLIC OFFENSE EVEN THOUGH THE 
STATE STANDARD WAS REVISED TO ".08 GRAMS OR 
GREATER". 
Prior to revision of the Utah State Code, the Salt Lake City 
ordinance and the State statute governing the presumed level of 
impairment were the same: "a breath alcohol contemt of 0.08% or 
greater by weight. . ." The State legislature subseguently 
changed the statute to a "breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams 
or greater". Utah Code Ann. Section 44-6-44(1)(a). 
Defendant's Brief states that the City and State statutes are 
materially different (Defendant's Brief, p. 7). However, defendant 
failed to provide the Court with any evidence reflecting that 
alleged difference, other than the mere wording of the statutes. 
In recent years, the Utah courts have clearly placed the burden on 
appellants to "marshal the evidence". See State v. Larsen, 828 
P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992); and Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 208 
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (1993). Defendant failed to provide this Court 
with any reason or basis on which to hold the wording in the 
statutes is materially different. As a result, this Court should 
assume that the ruling from the lower court is accurate, which 
ruling denied defendant's Motion after review of Memoranda 
submitted by both parties (R. 62, 53, 55, 58, 75). The only 
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evidence in the Record before this Court is that " .08%" and ".08 
grams" have the same meaning (R. 64, 65). 
As in the case of Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah 
App. 1990), the Salt Lake City and State statutes were at one time 
consistent. Subsequent amendments to the State statute have made 
the wording in the laws inconsistent but the Court requires that 
the difference "amount to an invalidating inconsistency." 
Richfield City, at 89. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with 
general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits 
or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, 
and vice versa. . . Unless legislative provisions are 
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they 
are not to be deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of 
uniformity in detail. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 92 P.2d 
671, 673 (Utah 1938). See also, Layton City v. Glines, 
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
Counsel for defendant argues that the Supreme Court seems to 
readopt the Dillon rule in Weese v. Davis County Com'n, 834 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1992) (Defendant's Brief, p. 8), which rule was originally 
adopted to prevent abuse by local governments. The Weese case 
involved a specific constitutional limitation on counties incurring 
debt, an issue which may require more restrictions to prevent 
abuse. However, the case of State v. Hutchinsonf 624 P.2d 1116 
(Utah 1980), rejected the Dillon rule, stating that local 
ordinances were to be: 
. . . adjudged valid by the courts, provided they are 
reasonable and consonant with the general powers and 
purposes of the local corporation, and not inconsistent 
with the United States Constitution, treaties, and 
statutes, and the laws and policy of the state. 
Hutchinson, at 1125 (emphasis added). 
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The Court continued: 
"And the courts will not interfere with the legislative 
choice of the means selected unless it is arbitrary, or 
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the 
policy of, the state or federal laws or the constitution 
of this State or of the United States. . . Specific 
grants should generally be construed with reasonable 
latitude in light of the broad language of the general 
welfare clause which may supplement the power found in a 
specific delegation. Hutchinson, at 1126 (emphasis 
added). 
This Court should liberally construe the Salt Lake City 
statute as a public offense, in accordance with Hutchinson, finding 
the underlying policy of the Salt Lake City ordinance and the State 
statute is the same, particularly as there is no evidence of a 
conflict between the laws. 
The standard of review for a trial court's question of law and 
statutory interpretation is to give no deference to the ruling of 
the lower court. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). In 
that case, the Supreme Court stated: 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the 
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. Reeves, at 
115. 
The purpose of the Salt Lake City DUI statute is to prevent 
people from operating a vehicle which they are in an intoxicated or 
impaired condition, a purpose which corresponds to the underlying 
purpose of the State Code. 
II. THE IDENTICAL LANGUAGE IN BOTH THE CITY AND 
STATE STATUTES REGARDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE 
RESULTS OF A BREATH TEST COULD HAVE BEEN THE 
BASIS FOR THE JURY'S DECISION. 
Driving under the influence of alcohol statutes for Salt Lake 
City and the State of Utah contain an alternative to the chemical 
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test. The alternative is the same and is unquestionably a public 
offense: 
Or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to 
a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. (See statutes set out fully in 
Addendum.) 
The Information charging the defendant listed that alternative to 
the City proving results of a breath test (R. 8). Evidence of 
impairment was submitted to the jury but way of testimony of two 
police officers (R. 50). In addition, the jury was instructed as 
to the alternative language of the statutes and the interpretation 
of evidence presented at trial (R. 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 29). 
The verdict form signed by the foreperson of the jury clearly 
listed the alternative language (R. 43). 
The jury could have rejected the breath test and based their 
decision solely on the alternative language that defendant was 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. This Court should not now 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury as the Record reflects 
that the issue was properly submitted to them for consideration. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah, 1985). 
Most cases state the standard of review for a jury verdict 
where sufficiency of the evidence is raised by an appellant. That 
issue has not been raised in the present case and there is no 
evidence for this Court to consider except that defendant was found 
guilty (R. 43). The Supreme Court has delineated the function of 
a jury as follows: 
The function of a jury is to act as reasonable persons in 
discerning the true state of the facts where factual 
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disputes exist, to discern the credibility of witnesses, 
and to apply the law to the facts as instructed by the 
trial court in reaching a verdict. Jury verdicts are 
upheld 
(I)f there is any substantial competent evidence upon 
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the 
finding. . . But if the finding is so plainly 
unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting 
fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it cannot 
be said to be supported by substantial evidence. Reeves, 
at 114-115. 
As there is no evidence to show the jury was not acting fairly and 
reasonably, their verdict should be upheld. 
Conclusion 
The evidence before this Court based on the Record does not 
reflect a material difference between the provisions of the Salt 
Lake City Code and the Utah State statute governing the offense of 
driving under the Influence of alcohol. As a result, the Salt Lake 
City Code should be upheld as a public offense, particularly in 
view of the alternative language which could have been the sole 
basis for the jury verdict. The City respectfully requests that 
this Court uphold the conviction of defendant. 
Dated this 28th day of June, 1993. 
*& srr77£^ , 
Cheryr-D^-iu-ke 
Marsha S. Atkin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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shall be entitled to park at any parking meter and in the follow-
ing identified restricted parking areas, without charge, notwith-
standing any other state or municipal parking restriction: 
Freight loading zones, passenger loading zones, and time-limited 
parking zones. 
B. It is unlawful for such handicapped person to: 
1. Park for longer than reasonable periods of time at all such 
meters and restricted parking areas where the maximum metered 
or designated time is longer than thirty minutes, 
2. Park for longer than the maximum metered or designated time 
at all other meters and restricted parking areas except those 
listed under subsection A of this section. 
12.24.030 INCOMPETENT DRIVERS DESIGNATED AND PROHIBITED. 
No person under the age of sixteen years, and no person physically or 
mentally disabled or incapacitated in any particular, temporarily or 
permanently, shall drive a motor vehicle upon any street or alley, 
provided such disability or incapacity is such as to interfere with 
the reasonable and safe operation of such vehicle. 
12.24.040 PERMITTING INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE PROHIBITED. 
No driver or person having charge or control of any motor vehicle 
shall require or knowingly permit any prohibited person, as set forth 
in Section 12.24.030, or its successor, to drive the same or knowingly 
permit or require the operation of any vehicle in any manner contrary 
to law. 
12.24.050 INCAPABLE DRIVERS DESIGNATED AND PROHIBITED. 
No driver shall operate a vehicle while his or her ability or alert-
ness is so impaired through fatigue, illness or any other cause as to 
make it unsafe for him or her to drive such vehicle. 
12.24.060 PERMITTING INCAPABLE DRIVERS TO DRIVE PROHIBITED. 
No owner or person in control of a vehicle shall knowingly permit 
said vehicle to be operated by any person who is physically or 
mentally disabled to such an extent that such person's judgment or 
driving ability is impaired. 
12.24.U70 DRINKING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN VEHICLES. 
A. No person shall drink any alcoholic beverage while driving a mo-
tor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the 
vehicle is moving, stopped, or parked on any street or highway. 
B. No person shall keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another 
to keep, carry, possess or transport in the passenger compartment 
of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any public street or 
highway, any container whatsoever which contains any alcoholic 
beverage, if the container has been opened, the seal thereon 
broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. 
C. For purposes of this section: 
1. "Alcoholic beverages" shall have the meaning provided in Sec-
tion 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, or its successor, and 
2. "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normal-
ly occupied by the driver and his or her passengers, and in-
cludes areas accessible to them while traveling, such as a 
utility or glove compartment, but does not include a separate 
front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle 
not accessible to the driver or passengers while inside the 
vehicle. 
0. The provisions of subsections A and B of this section shall not 
apply to passengers in the living quarters of a motor home or 
camper, but the driver of the vehicle will be prohibited from 
consuming alcoholic beverages as provided in subsection A of this 
section. 
E. The provisions of subsection B shall not apply to passengers trav-
eling in any duly licensed taxicab or bus. 
F. Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of 
an infraction. 
12.24.080 INTOXICATED PERSONS IN OR ABOUT VEHICLES. 
It is unlawful for any person under the influence of alcohol or any 
drugs to be in or about any vehicle with the intention of driving or 
operating such vehicle. 
12.24.090 PERMITTING USE OF VEHICLE BY HABITUAL DRINKER OR DRUG USER. 
It is unlawful for the owner of any motor vehicle, or any person hav-
ing such in charge, to permit same to be driven or operated on an} 
street by any person who is a habitual usen of any drugs, or by an> 
person who is under the influence of alcohol or any drugs. 
12.24.100 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS AND INTOXICANTS 
PROHIBITED - PENALTIES 
A. 1. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for 
any person to operate or be in actual physical control of c 
vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or breatr 
alcohol content of ,08 percent or greater by weight as showr 
by a chemical test given within two hours after the allegec 
operation or physical control, or if the person under the 
influence of alcohol or any arug, or the combined intljence 
of alcohol or any drug to a degree which renders the persor 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this city, 
2. The fact that a person charged with violating this section is 
or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does 
not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
B. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall oe based upor 
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood, anc 
the percent by weight alcohol in the breath shall be based upor 
grams of alcohol per 21U liters of breath. 
C. Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of « 
section A of this section shall be guilty of a Class B imsdemear 
D. 1. In addition to the penalties provided for in subsection C ot 
this section, the court shall, upon a first conviction, im-
pose either. 
«,.«-,.vii«ui cu-rorxy nours, 
witn empnasls on serving in the drunk tank of the j a i l , or 
b. Require the person to work in a community-service work 
program tor not less than twenty-four hours nor more than 
f i f t y hours, 
2 . In addition to the requirements of subsection Dla or 01b 
above, the court shall order the person to participate m an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol reha-
b i l i t a t ion f a c i l i t y , at the person's expense. 
E. 1 . Upon a second conviction within f ive years after a f i r s t con-
viction under this section, in addition to the penalties pro-
vided for in sub-section C, the court shall impose either: 
a. A mandatory j a i l sentence of not less than two-hundred-
forty consecutive hours nor more than seven-hundred-twenty 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank- of the 
j a i l , or 
b. Require the person to work in a community-service work 
proyram for not less than eighty hours nor more than two-
hundred-forty hours. 
2 . In addition to the requirements of subsection Ela or ElD 
above, the court shall order the person to participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol reha-
b i l i t a t ion f a c i l i t y , and the court may, in i ts discretion, 
order the person to obtain treatment at the person's expense 
at an alcohol rehabi l i tat ion f a c i l i t y . 
F. 1 . Upon a subsequent conviction within f ive years after a second 
conviction under this section, in addition to the penalties 
provided for in subsection C, the court shall impose either: 
a. A mandatory j a i l sentence of not less than seven-hundred-
twenty hours nor more than two-thousand-one-hundred-sixty 
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the 
j a i l , or 
b. Require the person to work in a community-service work 
project for not less than eighty nours nor lore :han 
seven-hunared-twenty nours. 
2. In addition to the requirements ot subsections Fla or Fib 
above, the court snail order the person at the person's 
expense to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabi l i tat ion 
faci 1 l t y . 
(a. In no event shall any combination of imprisonment and/or commun-
ity service imposed under subsections L, 0 , E and F above exceed 
six months' duration. 
H. No portion of any sentence imposed under subsection C shall be 
suspended, and the convicted person shall not be e l ig ib le for 
parole or probation unti l such time as any sentence imposed 
under subsections D, E or F of this section has been served. 
I . 1 . When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest 
to a charge of a violation of Section 12.52.350 of this t i t l e , 
or i ts successor, in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for , 
an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for 
the plea, including whether or not defendant had consumed a l -
cohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in connection with 
the offense. The prosecutor's statement shall be an offer of 
proof of the facts which show whether or not defendant had 
consumed alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, in con-
nection with the offense. 
2. The court shall advise the defendant, before acceptmy the 
plea offered under subsection I I above, of the consequences 
of a violation of Section 12.52.35U of this t i t l e , or i ts 
successor, in substance as follows: " I f the court accepts 
the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating said Section 12.52.350, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drug' 
or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the offense, the resulting conviction shall be a prior of-
fense fo the purpose of subsections E and F of this section." 
J . A peam officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a 
violation of this section when: 
1 . The violation is coupled with an accident or coll ision in 
which the person is involved, or 
2. The off icer has reasonable cause to believe a violat ion has 
in fact been committed by the person, although not in the 
of f icer 's presence. 
K. This section 12.24.100 was enacted to be in harmony with and, in 
substance, the same as Section 41-6-44, l(tah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, or i ts successor. 
12.24.110 CHEMICAL TESTS AS EVIDENCE. 
A. In any action or proceeding in which i t is material to prove that 
a person was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence ot alcohol or with a blood alcohol con-
tent statutori ly prohibited, the results of a chemical test or 
tests, as authorized under Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, or I ts successor, shall be admissible as evidence. 
B. I f the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged 
driving or actual physical control , the blood alcohol level of 
the person shal l , at the time ot the alleged driving or actjal 
physical control, be presumed to have been not less than the lev-
el ot the alcohol determined to be in the blood by the chemical 
test . 
C. I f the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the a l -
leged driving or actual physical control , the test result shall 
be admissible as evidence of the person's blood alcohol level at 
the time of the alleged driving or actual physical control, but 
the t r i e r of fact shall determine what weight shall oe given to 
the result of the test . 
0. The foregoing provisions of this section shall not prevent a 
court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a de-
fendant's blood alcohol l e v e l , or of other violations of this 
t i t l e , at the time of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control. 
E. This Section 12.24.110 was enacted to be in harmony with and n 
substance the same as Section 41-6-44.5, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, or i ts successor. 
41-6-43.10 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving, 
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern 
those matters. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1978, 
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old § 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch. 
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relat-
ing to powers of local authorities as to driving 
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a 
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 
242, § 12. 
Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former 
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to 
powers of local authorities, and enacted 
present § 41-6-43. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operating" for "driving" 
both places it appears in this section and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Cross-References. — Traffic regulations, 
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30. 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of interim repeal. 
Powers of cities. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of interim repeal. 
The interim repeal of this section did not 
render municipalities without authority to 
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the 
influence of alcohol as municipalities had au-
thority under their general police powers to 
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-
cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City 
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
Powers of cities. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwith-
standing statute on the subject. Salt Lake City 
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq. 
61A C J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625 CcJ.S. 
to 637. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles 332. 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. 
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), 
relating to negligent homicide, was repealed 
by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without war-
rant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
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after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, 
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addi-
tion to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jaril sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second con-
viction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this sec-
tion adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in 
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the 
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation 
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or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not rein-
state any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is 
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all 
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, as-
sessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing 
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; 
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or 
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or 
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by 
the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of 
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea of-
fered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the result-
ing conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall 
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previ-
ous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections 
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before 
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sen-
tence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and sec-
ond sentences, substituting "But" for "except 
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into 
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the 
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into 
the first and second sentences; substituted 
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection 
(5)(c); deleted "such time as" after "probation 
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c); 
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted per-
son" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided 
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and 
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of 
Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c); substituted "the 
officer has probable cause to believe the viola-
tion has occurred" for "the violation is coupled 
with an accident or collision in which the per-
son is involved and when the violation has, in 
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substi-
tuted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end 
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of" before 
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and 
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made 
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation, 
and style. 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122, 
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "pro-
vided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten 
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for 
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted 
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80 
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days"; 
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for 
"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for 
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days". 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178, 
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language 
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor" 
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or 
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and im-
prisonment" in the first sentence and the lan-
guage beginning "is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor" for "shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a 
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second 
sentence. 
The 1987 amendment designated the previ-
ously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1) 
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29 
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to 
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracti-
cable; in Subsection (2) added the phrase fol-
lowing "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection 
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not 
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor" 
in the first sentence and deleted "any impris-
onment in the county jail shall be for not more 
than one year" at the end of the second sen-
tence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or"; 
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for 
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted 
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test" 
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as 
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a), 
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for 
the former provisions which read "Percent by 
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic 
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight 
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and 
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